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Applied Artificial Intelligence in Modern
Warfare and National Security Policy
BRIAN SEAMUS HANEY1

Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications in modern warfare have
revolutionized national security power dynamics between the United
States, China, Russia, and the private industry. The United States has fallen
behind in military technologies and is now at the mercy of big technology
companies to maintain peace. After committing $150 billion toward the
goal of becoming the AI technology world leader, China claimed success in
2018. In 2019, Chinese researchers published open-source code for AI
missile systems controlled by deep reinforcement learning algorithms.
Further, Russia’s continued interference in United States’ elections has
largely been driven by AI applications in cybersecurity. Yet, despite
outspending Russia and China combined on defense, the United States is
failing to keep pace with foreign adversaries in the AI arms race.
Previous legal scholarship dismisses AI militarization as futuristic
science-fiction, accepting without support the United States’ prominence as
the world leader in military technology. This inter-disciplinary article
provides three main contributions to legal scholarship. First, this is the first
piece in legal scholarship to take an informatics-based approach toward
analyzing the range of AI applications in modern warfare. Second, this is
the first piece in legal scholarship to take an informatics-based approach in
analyzing national security policy. Third, this is the first piece to explore
the complex power and security dynamics between the United States,
China, Russia, and private corporations in the AI arms race. Ultimately, a
new era of advanced weaponry is developing, and the United States
Government is sitting on the sidelines.

1. J.D. Notre Dame Law School 2018, B.A. Washington & Jefferson College 2015.
Special thanks to Richard Susskind, Margaret Cuonzo, Max Tegmark, Ethem Alpaydin,
Sam Altman, Josh Achiam, Volodymyr Mnih & Angela Elias.
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Introduction
Cyberwarfare continues on a daily basis, with the United States under
constant attack.2 Threats of nuclear missile strikes from adversaries appear
in daily headlines.3 Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the United States’
most powerful weapon for defense.4 Yet, in AI development, the United
States is falling behind adversaries like China and Russia.5 In 2017, China
committed $150 billion toward becoming the world leader in AI, claiming
success the next year.6 Interference in U.S. elections is largely being driven
by substantial Russian investments in AI cybersecurity applications.7 All
the while, the United States Government and Department of Defense
remain at the mercy of big technology companies like Google and
Microsoft to ensure advancements in AI research and development.8
The Law of Accelerating Returns (“LOAR”) states that fundamental
measures of information technology follow predictable and exponential
trajectories.9 Indeed, information technologies build on themselves in an
exponential manner.10 Applied to AI, the LOAR provides strong support

2. James Kadtke & , John Wharton, Technology and National Security: The United
States at a Critical Crossroads, DEFENSE HORIZONS 84, National Defense University 1
(March 2018).
3. Hyung-Jin Kim, North Korea Confirms Second 2nd Test of a Multiple Rocket
Launcher, MILITARY TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/20
19/09/11/north-korea-confirms-2nd-test-of-multiple-rocket-launcher/; see also https://time.
com/5673813/north-korea-confirms-second-rocket-launcher-test/. See also Nasser Karimi
&, John Gambrell, Iran Uuses Advanced Centrifuges, Threatens Higher Enrichment,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/7e896f8a1b0c40769b54ed4
f98a0f5e6.
4. Karl ManheimKarl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to
Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 108 (2019); see also User Clip: Elon
Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15,
2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association2017-summer-meeting & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and
Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 108 (2019); see also User Clip: Elon Musk at the
National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15, 2017) https://
www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association-2017-summer
-meeting.
5. Kadtke & Wharton, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Gregory C. Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic
Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, Center for a New American
Security 9 (2019).
7. KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 24 (2019).
8. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354 (2016).
9. RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 250 (2012).
10. Id. at 251-55.
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for AI’s increasing role in protecting the national defense.11 Indeed, similar
to the way in which aviation and nuclear weapons transformed the military
landscape in the twentieth century, AI is reconstructing the fundamental
nature of military technologies today.12
Yet legal scholars continue to deny and ignore AI’s applications as a
weapon of mass destruction. For example, in a recent MIT Starr Forum
Report, the Honorable James E. Baker, former Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, argues “we really won’t
need to worry about the long-term existential risks.”13 And, University of
Washington Law Professor, Ryan Calo argues, regulators should not be
distracted by claims of an “AI Apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on
“more immediate harms.”14 All the while, private corporations are pouring
billions into AI research, development, and deployment.15 In a 2019
interview, Paul M. Nakasone, The Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA) stated, “I suspect that AI will play a future role in helping
us discern vulnerabilities quicker and allow us to focus on options that will
have a higher likelihood of success.”16 Yet, Elon Musk argues today, “[t]he
biggest risk that we face as a civilization is artificial intelligence.”17 The
variance in the position of industry leaders relating to AI and defense
demonstrates a glaring disconnect and information gap between legal
scholars, government leaders, and the private industry.
The purpose of this Article is to aid in closing the information gap by
explaining the applications of AI in modern warfare. Further, this article
contributes the first informatics-based analysis of the national security
policy landscape. This article proceeds in three parts: Part I explains the
state-of-the-art in AI technology; Part II explores three national security
threats resulting from AI applications in modern warfare; and Part III
discusses national security policy relating to AI from international and
domestic perspectives.

11. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 94 (2017).
12. Honorable James E. Baker, Artificial Intelligence and National Security Law: A
Dangerous Nonchalance, STARR FORUM REPORT 1 (2018).
13. Id. at 5.
14. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 399, 431 (2017).
15. Andrew Thompson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in The United States:
An Analysis of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, 19 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 361, 363 (2019).
16. An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, 92 JOINT FORCE Q. 1, 9 (2019).
17. User Clip: Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer
Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15, 2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-nat
io nal-governors-association-2017-summer-meeting.
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I. Artificial Intelligence
Contemporary scholars have presented several different definitions of
AI. For example, MIT Professor Max Tegmark concisely defines
intelligence as the ability to achieve goals18 and AI as “non-biological
intelligence.”19 Additionally, according to Stanford Professor Nils Nilsson
AI is “concerned with intelligent behavior in artifacts.”20 A recent One
Hundred Years Study defines AI as, “a science and a set of computational
technologies that are inspired by—but typically operate quite differently
from—the ways people use their nervous systems and bodies to sense,
learn, reason, and take action.”21 For the purposes of this paper AI is any
system replicating the thoughtful processes associated with human
thought.22 Advancements in AI technologies continue at alarming rates.23
This Part proceeds by discussing three types of AI systems commonly used
in the context of national security: deep learning, reinforcement learning,
and deep reinforcement learning.
A. Deep Learning

Deep learning is a process by which neural networks learn from large
amounts of data.24 Defined, data is any recorded information about the
world.25 In deep learning, the idea is to learn feature levels of increasing
abstraction with minimum human contribution.26 The models inspiring
current deep learning architectures have been around since the 1950s.27
Indeed, the Perceptron, which serves as the basic tool of neural networks
was proposed by Frank Rosenblatt in 1957.28 However, artificial
intelligence research remained relatively unprosperous until the dawn of

18. MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0 BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
50 (2017).
19. Id. at 39.
20. NILS J. NILSSON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A NEW SYNTHESIS 1 (1998).
21. Stan. U., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, One Hundred Year Study on
Artificial Intelligence, 1 (2016).
22. Brian S. Haney, The Perils and Promises of Artificial General Intelligence, 45 J.
LEGIS. 151, 152 (2018).
23. PAUL E. CERUZZI, COMPUTING A CONCISE HISTORY 114 (2012).
24. Haney, supra note 22, at 157.
25. ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 3 (2016). See also MICHAEL
BUCKLAND, INFORMATION AND SOCIETY 21-22 (2017) (discussing definitions of
information).
26. JOHN D. KELLEHER, BRENDEN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 134 (2018).
27. SEBASTIAN RASCHKA & VAHID MIRJALILI, PYTHON MACHINE LEARNING 18 (2017).
28. Id.
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the internet.29 Generally, deep learning systems are developed in four parts:
data pre-processing, model design, training, and testing.
Deep learning is all about the data.30 Every two days humans create
more data than the total amount of data created from the dawn of humanity
until 2003.31 Indeed, the internet is the driving force behind modern deep
learning strategies because the internet has enabled humanity to organize
and aggregate massive amounts of data.32 According to machine learning
scholar, Ethem Alpaydin, it’s the data that drives the operation, not human
programmers.33 The majority of the time spent with deep learning system
development is during the pre-processing stage.34 During this initial phase,
machine learning researchers gather, organize, and aggregate data to be
analyzed by neural networks.35
The types of data neural networks process vary.36 For example, in
autonomous warfare systems, images stored as pixel values are associated
with object classification for targeting.37 Another example is gaining
political insight with a dataset of publicly available personal data on
foreign officials. How the data is organized largely depends on the goal of
the deep learning system.38 If a system is being developed for predictive
purposes the data may be labeled with positive and negative instances of an
occurrence.39 Or, if the system is being learned to gain insight, the data may
remain unstructured, allowing the model to complete the organization
task.40
A deep learning system’s model is the part of the system which
analyzes the information.41 Most commonly the model is a neural
network.42 Neural networks serve the function of associating information to
29. PETER J. DENNING & MATTI TEDRE, COMPUTATIONAL THINKING 93 (2019).
30. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with The Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 668 (2017).
31. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 11 (2nd ed. 2017).
32. ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 10-11.
33. Id. at 12.
34. KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 97.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 101.
37. Symposium, A Framework Using Machine Vision and Deep Reinforcement
Learning for Self-Learning Moving Objects in a Virtual Environment, AAAI 2017 Fall
Symposium Series (2017), https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/FSS/FSS17/paper/view/16003/
15319.pdf.
38. Michael Simon, et al., Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal
Profession, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH 254, 300 (2018).
39. Tariq Rashid, MAKE YOUR OWN NEURAL NETWORK 13 (2018).
40. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 111.
41. Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 121.
42. Tegmark, supra note 18, at 76.
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derive knowledge.43 Neural networks models are based on the biological
neo-cortex.44 Indeed, the human brain is composed of processing units
called neurons.45 Each neuron in the brain is connected to other neurons
through structures called synapses.46 A biological neuron consists of
dendrites—receivers of various electrical impulses from other neurons—
that are gathered in the cell body of a neuron.47 Once the neuron’s cell body
has collected enough electrical energy to exceed a threshold amount, the
neuron transmits an electrical charge to other neurons in the brain through
synapses.48 This transfer of information in the biological brain provides the
foundation on which modern neural networks are modeled and operate.49
Every neural network has an input layer and an output layer.50
However, in between the input and output layer, neural networks contain
multiple hidden layers of connected neurons.51 In a neural network, the
neurons are connected by weight coefficients modeling the strength of
synapses in the biological brain.52 The depth of the network is in large part
a description of the number of hidden layers.53 Deep Neural Networks start
from raw input and then each hidden layer combines the values in its
preceding layer and learns more complicated functions of the input.54 The
mathematics of the network transferring information from input to output
varies, but is generally matrix mathematics and vector calculus.55 During
training, the model processes data from input to output, often described as
the feedforward portion.56 The output of the model is typically a
prediction.57 For example, whether an object is the correct target, or the
wrong target would be calculated with a convolutional neural network

43. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 106-107.
44. Michael Simon, et al., supra note 38, 254.
45. Moheb Costandi, NEUROPLASTICITY 6 (2016).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Raschka & Mirjalili, supra note 27, at 18.
49. Haney, supra note 22 at 158.
50. Kurzweil, supra note 9, at 132.
51. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 100.
52. Id. at 88.
53. Tegmark, supra note 18, at 76.
54. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 104.
55. Manon Legrand, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Autonomous Vehicle Control
Among Human Drivers, at 23 (academic year 2016–17) (unpublished C.S. thesis, Université
Libre de Bruxelles), https://ai.vub.ac.be/sites/default/files/thesis_legrand.pdf.
56. Eugene Charniak, INTRODUCTION TO DEEP LEARNING 10 (2018).
57. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014).
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(CNN).58 The function of the CNN is in essence a classification task, where
the CNN classifies objects or areas based upon their similarity.59 CNNs are
the main model used for deep learning in computer vision tasks.60
However, the learning occurs during the backpropagation process.61
Backpropagation describes the way which neural networks are trained to
derive meaning from data.62 Generally, the mathematics of the
backpropagation algorithm includes partial derivative calculations and a
loss function to be minimized.63 The algorithm’s essential function adjusts
the weights of a neural network to reduce error.64 The algorithm’s ultimate
goal is the convergence of an optimal network, but probabilistic
maximization also provides state-of-the-art performance in real world
domains.65 Dynamic feedback allows derivative calculations supporting
error minimization.66 One popular algorithm for backpropagation is
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), iteratively updates the weights of the
network according to a loss function.67
After the training process the model is then tested on new data, and if
successful, deployed for the purpose deriving knowledge from
information.68 The process of deriving knowledge from information is
commonly accomplished with feature extraction.69 Feature extraction is a
method of dimensionality reduction allowing raw inputs to convert to an
output revealing abstract relationships among data.70 Neural networks
extract these abstract relationships by combining previous input
information in higher dimensional space as the network iterates.71 In other
words, deep neural networks learn more complicated functions of their
initial input when each hidden layer combines the values of the preceding

58. Daniel Maturana & Sebastian Scherer, 3D Convolutional Neural Networks for
Landing Zone Detection from LiDar, 2 (2015), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
7139679.
59. Rashid, supra note 39, at 159.
60. Legrand, supra note 55, at 23.
61. Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 130.
62. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 100.
63. Paul John Werbos, THE ROOTS OF BACKPROPAGATION FROM ORDERED DERIVATIVES
TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND POLITICAL FORECASTING 269 (1994).
64. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 89.
65. Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 131.
66. Werbos, supra note 63, at 72.
67. Steven M Bellovin, et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
1, 29 (2019).
68. Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 106-107.
69. Id. at 89.
70. Id. at 102.
71. Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 135.
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layer.72 In addition to deep learning, reinforcement learning is also a major
cause of concern for purposes of national security policy.
B. Reinforcement Learning

At its core, reinforcement learning is an optimization algorithm.73 In
short, reinforcement learning is a type of machine learning concerned with
learning how an agent should behave in an environment to maximize a
reward.74 Agents are the software programs making intelligent decisions.75
Generally, reinforcement learning algorithms contain three elements:
Model: the description of the agent-environment relationship;
Policy: the way in which the agent makes decisions; and
Reward: the agent’s goal.76
The fundamental reinforcement learning model is the Markov
Decision Process (MDP).77 The MDP model was developed by the Russian
Mathematician Andrey Markov in 1913.78 Interestingly, Markov’s work
over a century ago remains the state-of-the-art in AI today.79 The model
below describes the agent-environment interaction in an MDP:80

72. ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 104.
73. Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement
Learning, 518 NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 529, 529 (2015).
74. ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 127.
75. RICHARD S. SUTTON, ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN
INTRODUCTION 3 (The MIT Press eds., 2nd ed. 2017).
76. Katerina Fragkiadaki, Deep Q Learning, Carnegie Mellon Computer Science,
CMU 10703 (Fall 2018), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~katef/DeepRLFall2018/lecture_DQL_k
ate f2018.pdf.
77. Haney, supra note 22 at 161.
78. Gely P. Basharin, et al, The Life and Work of A.A. Markov, 386 Linear Algebra and
its Applications, 4, 15 (2004).
79. GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER GOOGLE 75 (2018).
80. SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 38. (model created by author based on
illustration at the preceding citation).
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The environment is made up of states for each point in time in which the
environment exists.81 The learning begins when the agent takes an initial
action selected from the first state in the environment.82 Once the agent
selects an action, the environment returns a reward and the next state.83
Generally, the goal for the agent is to interact with its environment
according to an optimal policy.84
The second element of the reinforcement learning framework is the
policy. A policy is the way in which an agent makes decisions or chooses
actions within a state.85 In other words, the agent chooses which action to
take when presented with a state based upon the agent’s policy.86 For
example, a greedy person has a policy that routinely guides their decision
making toward acquiring the most wealth. The goal of the policy is to
allow the agent to advance through the environment so as to maximize a
reward.87
The third element of the reinforcement learning framework is the
reward. Ultimately, the purpose of reinforcement learning is to maximize
an agent’s reward.88 However, the reward itself may is defined by the
designer of the algorithm. For each action the agent takes in the
environment, a reward is returned.89 There are various ways of defining
reward, based upon the specific application.90 But generally, the reward is
associated with the final goal of the agent.91 For example, in a trading
algorithm, the reward is money.92 In sum, the goal of reinforcement
learning is to learn good policies for sequential decision problems by
optimizing a cumulative future reward.93 Interestingly, many thinkers
throughout history have argued the human mind is itself a reinforcement
learning system.94 Furthermore, reinforcement learning algorithms add

81. ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 126-127.
82. SUTTON, BARTO, supra note 75, at 2.
83. MYKEL J. KOCHENDERFER, DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 77 (2015).
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id.
86. SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 39.
87. WERBOS, supra note 63, at 311.
88. SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 7.
89. KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 77.
90. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 239.
91. MAXIM LAPAN, DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING HANDS-ON 3 (2018).
92. Id. at 217.
93. Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, & David Silver, Deep Reinforcement Learning
with Q-Learning, Google DeepMind, 2094 (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.06461.
94. WERBOS, supra note 63, at 307.
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substantial improvements to deep learning models, especially when the two
models are combined.95
C. Deep Reinforcement Learning

Deep Reinforcement Learning is an intelligence technique
combining deep learning and reinforcement learning principles. Max
Tegmark suggests that deep reinforcement learning was developed by
Google in 2015.96 However, earlier scholarship explores and explains the
integration of neural networks in the reinforcement learning paradigm.97
Arguably, deep reinforcement learning is a method of general intelligence
because of its theoretic capability to solve any continuous control task.98
For example, deep reinforcement learning algorithms drive state-of-the-art
autonomous vehicles.99 However, it shows poorer performance on other
types of tasks like writing, because mastery of human language is—for
now—not describable as a continuous control problem.100 Regardless of its
scalable nature toward general intelligence, deep reinforcement learning is
a powerful type of artificial intelligence.101 Generally, there are three
different frameworks for deep reinforcement learning: action-value, policy
gradient, and actor-critic.102
An example of an action-value based framework for a deep
reinforcement learning algorithm is the Deep Q-Network (DQN).103 The
DQN algorithm is a type of model-free-learning.104 In model-free-learning,
there isn’t a formal description of the agent-environment relationship.105
Instead, the agent randomly explores the environment, gathering
information about the environment’s states, actions, and rewards.106 The
algorithm stores the information in memory, called experience.107

95. ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 136.
96. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 85.
97. WERBOS, supra note 63, at 307.
98. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 39.
99. Alex Kendall, et al., Learning to Drive in A Day (2018), https://arxiv.org/
abs/1807.00412.
100. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 17 (1957).
101. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 39.
102. Shixun You, et al., Deep Reinforcement Learning for Target Searching in
Cognitive Electronic Warfare, IEEE Access Vol. 7, 37432, 37438 (2019).
103. Mnih, et al., supra note 73, at 529.
104. KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 122.
105. Id. at 121.
106. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 127.
107. CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 133.
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The DQN algorithm develops an optimal policy ∗ for an agent
with a Q-learning algorithm.108 The optimal policy is the best method of
decision making for an agent with the goal of maximizing reward.109 The
Q-learning algorithm maximizes a Q-function: Q , , where is the state
of an environment and is an action in the state.110 In essence, by applying
,
in an
the optimal Q-function ∗ to every state-action pair
environment, the agent is acting according to the optimal policy.111
However, computing Q ,
for each state-action pair in the environment
is computationally expensive.112
Instead, the DQN algorithm approximates the value of each state
state-action pair:113
, ;
, .
Here,
represents the function parameters, which are the function’s
variables.114 The parameters are determined by a neural network using
experience replay.115 Experience replay refers to the agent’s experiences
stored in memory, which are used to train the neural network to
approximate the value of state-action pairs.116 The neural network iterates
until the convergence of the Q-function as determined by the Bellman
Equation:117
∗
,
max ∗ , | , .
~
Here,
is the reward, is a
~ refers to the expectation for all states,
discount factor typically defined 0
1, allowing present rewards to
function describes an action at
have higher value.118 Additionally, the
which the Q-function takes its maximal value for each state-action pair.119
In other words, the Bellman Equation does two things; it defines the

108. Mnih, et al., supra note 73, at 529.
109. KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 80-81.
110. Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement
Learning, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/097,862 at 5 (filed Dec. 5, 2013), https://patents.
google.com/patent/US20150100530A1/en.
111. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 144.
112. Mnih & Kavukcuoglu, supra note 110, at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 133.
116. Id.
117. Haney, supra note 22, at 162.
118. KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 78.
119. Brian S. Haney, The Optimal Agent: The Future of Autonomous Vehicles &
Liability Theory, 29 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3261275.
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optimal Q-function and allows the agent to consider the reward from its
present state as greater relative to similar rewards in future states.120
Thus, the DQN algorithm combines Q-learning with a neural network to
maximize reward.121 After the optimal policy is defined according to:
∗
∗
, ,
the agent engages in the exploitation of its environment.122 During the
exploitation phase, the agent maximizes its reward by making decisions
according to the optimal policy.123 The DQN is an off-policy algorithm,
meaning it uses data to optimize performance.124 Indeed, DQN is
essentially a reinforcement learning algorithm, where the agent uses a
neural network to decide which actions to take.
A second variant of deep reinforcement learning is the Proximal
Policy Optimization (“PPO”) algorithm, a gradient technique.125 Similar to
the DQN algorithm, the PPO algorithm is a method of model-free
learning.126 In contrast to the DQN algorithm, PPO is an on-policy
algorithm, meaning it does not learn from old data and instead directly
optimize policy performance.127 One advantage of the PPO model is that it
can be used for environments with either discrete or continuous action
spaces.128
In general, PPO works by computing an estimator of the policy
gradient and iterating with a stochastic gradient optimization algorithm.129
In other words, the algorithm continuously updates the agent’s policy based
on the old policy’s performance.130 The PPO update algorithm may be
defined:131
arg max , ~
.
, , ,
120. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 102-03.
121. WERBOS, supra note 63, at 306-07.
122. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 127.
123. Id.
124. Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, and David Silver, Deep Reinforcement Learning
with Q-Learning, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2098 (2016), https://www.a
aai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/download/12389/11847.
125. John Schulman, et al., High-Dimensional Continuous Control Using Generalized
Advantage Estimation, INT’L CONF. ON LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS (2016), https://ar
xiv.org/abs/1506.02438.
126. CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 124.
127. OpenAI, Proximal Policy Optimization, OpenAI Spinning UP (2018), https://spin
ningup.openai.com/en/latest/algorithms/ppo.html.
128. Id.
129. John Schulman, et al., Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithms, OpenAI at 2
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.06347.
130. KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 80.
131. Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127.
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Here,
, , ,
is the objective function, are the policy parameters,
are the policy parameters for
experiment.132 Generally, the PPO
update is a method of incremental improvement for a policy’s expected
return.133 Essentially, the algorithm takes multiple steps via SGD to
maximize the objective.134
The PPO algorithm’s key to the success is obtaining good
estimates of an advantage function.135 The advantage function describes the
advantage of a particular policy relative to another policy.136 For example,
if the advantage for the state-action pair is positive, the objective reduces
to:137
|
, .
, , ,
, 1
|
is the advantage estimate for the policy given parameters
Here,
| , and the hyperparameter corresponds to how far away the new
policy can step from the old while still profiting the objective.138 Where the
advantage is positive the objective increases and the
function puts a
139
limit to how much the objective can increase.
The limitation on the objective increase is called clipping.140 The
algorithm’s goal is to make the largest possible improvement on a policy,
without stepping so far as to cause performance collapse.141 To achieve this
goal, PPO relies on clipping the objective function to remove incentives for
the new policy to step far from the old policy.142 In essence, the clipping
serves as a regularizer, minimizing incentives for the policy to change
dramatically.143
A third variant of Deep Reinforcement Learning and an example of
the actor-critic framework is the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
(“DDPG”) algorithm.144 Like both DQN and PPO, DDPG is a model-free

132. Id.
133. Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 2.
134. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 427.
135. See Schulman, et al., supra note 125.
136. See Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127.
137. Id.
138. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 432.
139. See Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127.
140. Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 3.
141. Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127.
142. Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 3.
143. Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127.
144. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 410.
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learning method.145 However, unlike PPO, DDPG is only applicable in
continuous action spaces.146 In form DDPG is relatively similar to DQN.147
DDPG is an off-policy algorithm, meaning it re-uses old data.148 In short,
DDPG is a method of deep reinforcement learning using two function
approximators, an actor and a critic.149
The critic estimates the optimal action-value function ∗ .150 Generally,
the action-value function is tailored to continuous action spaces, defined:
∗
max ∗ , .
is defined as a value of ∗ , at which
Here, the optimal action ∗
takes its optimal value according to the Bellman Equation.151 The critic’s
role is to minimize loss, typically using a means squared error function, or
target network, which gives consistent target values.152 The input of the
target network is derived from a replay buffer, utilizing experience replay
similar to the DQN algorithm.153 As the process occurs, the actor is
iteratively updated accordingly.154 To learn the optimal policy the DDPG
which gives the action maximizing
learns a deterministic policy
, :155
max ~
.
,
are constants and ~ is the state
Here, the Q-function parameters
sampled from the replay buffer.156
Ultimately, the actor decides which action to take.157 But, to
optimize an agent’s reward, after each action, the critic tells the actor and

145. Timothy P. Lillicrap, et al., Continuous Control with Deep Reinforcement Learning, 1
(2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.02971.
146. OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, OpenAI Spinning UP (2018),
https://spinningup.openai.com/en/latest/algorithms/ddpg.html.
147. Lillicrap et al., supra note 145, at 1.
148. Aprit Agarwal, Katharina Muelling, Katerina Fragkiadaki, Model Learning for Lookahead Exploration in Continuous Control, Cornell University (Nov. 20, 2018), https://
arxiv.org/abs/1811.08086.
149. Alex Kendall et al., Learning to Drive in A Day, Cornell University (Sept. 11,
2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00412.
150. OpenAI, supra note 146.
151. Id.
152. Lillicrap et al., supra note 145, at 2.
153. Charniak, supra note 56, at 133.
154. David Silver et al., Deterministic Policy Gradient Algorithms, Deem Mind
Technologies (2014), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v32/silver14.pdf.
155. OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, supra note 146.
156. OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, supra note 146.
157. CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 130.

4 - HANEY_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2020]

APPLIED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

12/4/2019 10:01 AM

75

defines necessary adjustment for performance improvement.158 The DDPG
algorithm shows promise in continuous control tasks, for robotics control
systems.159 For example, DDPG has shown state-of-the-art success for
driving cars.160 However, the off-policy nature of the algorithm makes it
much slower because it takes more computational power to train compared
to the PPO and other on-policy algorithms. As computational hardware
develops, quantum computers provide a faster method of computing than
classical methods.161
In sum, deep learning, reinforcement learning, and deep
reinforcement learning provide a framework for analyzing the state-of-theart in AI technology. While the mathematical models underlying these
systems are not new, their capabilities have shown rapid improvement
symbiotically with the massive amount of information humans began
collecting at the dawn of the digital age.162 Most importantly, modern AI
systems are capable of generalizing information to make predictions and
achieve goals.163 As a result, these systems are transforming the
foundations of the defense industry, national security, and global warfare.

II. Security Threats
United States National Defense Strategy prioritizes competition
with China and Russia.164 Currently, among these three countries, there is
an on-going arms race toward developing the most powerful AI systems.165
Some hope this continued escalation can be avoided.166 However, the
incentives associated with becoming the world leader in AI technology are
great, while the harms of nations falling behind could surely be fatal.167
Thus, the AI arms races will certainly continue.

158. Aleksandra Faust et al., PRM-RL: Long-range Robotic Navigation Tasks by
Combining Reinforcement Learning and Sampling-based Planning (2018) https://a
rxiv.org/abs/1710.03937v2.
159. Id.
160. Alex Kendall et al., Learning to Drive in A Day (2018), https://arxiv.
org/abs/1807.00412.
161. Jacob Biamonte et al., Quantum Machine Learning at 2 (2018) https://arxiv.org/
abs/1611.09347.
162. GILDER, supra note 79, at 75; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 31, at 11.
163. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 85-86.
164. Mark D. Miles & Charles R. Miller, Global Risks and Opportunities the Great
Power Competition Paradigm, JFQ 94 3rd Quarter, at 80 (2019).
165. An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, National Defense University Press, JFQ 92,
1st Quarter, at 5 (2019).
166. Baker, supra note 12, at 5.
167. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 96-97.
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Northwestern Law Professor, John McGinnis, argues, “[t]he way to
think about the effects of AI on war is to think of the consequences of
substituting technologically advanced robots for humans on the
battlefield.”168 However, this mode of thought completely fails to
communicate AI security threats. Indeed, today the battlefield is
everywhere, and the United States is bombarded with cyber-attacks every
day.169 McGinnis further argues, “The existential dread of machines that
become uncontrollable by humans and the political anxiety about
machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield are
overblown.”170 Yet, China has developed and made publicly available stateof-the-art AI guided missile technology and computer programs.171 And,
Russia routinely and intentionally manipulates United States voters on
social media for the purposes of influencing political elections.172 In short,
AI is the most important weapon in modern warfare, primarily in the
defense, and national security sectors. The following sections will discuss
AI applications of three types of security threats: missile attack, cyberattack, and general intelligence.
A. Missiles

Richmond School of Law Professor and Member of the Center for
New American Security’s Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and
National Security, Rebecca Crootof, suggests weapons may be grouped
into three categories: inert, semi-autonomous, and autonomous.173 Inert
weapons require human operation to be lethal, such as, stones, knives, or
handheld firearms.174 Semi-autonomous weapon systems have autonomous
capabilities in functions relevant to target selection and engagement, but
the system cannot both select and engage targets independently.175 Third,
autonomous weapon systems are capable of independently selecting and
engaging targets based on conclusions derived from gathered information
and preprogramed constraints.176
168. John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1266 (2010).
169. John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to
National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 398 (2016).
170. McGinnis, supra note 168, at 1254.
171. Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447.
172. U.S. Department of Justice, Report on The Investigation into Russian Interference
in the 2016 Presidential Election, Vol I at 4 (March 2019), https://www.just
ice.gov/storage/report_volume1.pdf.
173. Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Limits of Analogy, 9
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 51, 59 (2018).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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Professor Crootof argues, “autonomous weapon systems in use
today act in largely predictable ways.”177 Similarly, The Honorable James
E. Baker, argues that autonomous weapon systems are nothing new.178
Judge Baker claims autonomous weapons have been standard military
technology since the 1970s, and the United States reserves the technology
for defensive purposes.179 Further, according to the Department of Defense,
“[p]otential adversaries are also developing an increasingly diverse,
expansive, and modern range of offensive missile systems that can threaten
U.S. forces abroad.”180 However, these perspectives sincerely
underestimate the capabilities modern missile systems, particularly in light
of AI advancements.181 Inarguably, AI has changed the role of robotics
control systems in warfare.182
It is important to understand foreign adversaries have the ability to
attack the United States homeland with AI controlled missile systems at
such a scale to which the United States would be entirely unable to
respond.183 Indeed, in a recent study funded by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Target
Searching in Cognitive Electronic Warfare (China AI Missile Study),
researchers demonstrate Chinese capabilities in deep reinforcement
learning control systems for missile control.184 The United States funded
similar research through the Naval Post-Graduate School in a 2017 report,
A Framework Using Machine Vision and Deep Reinforcement Learning for
Self-Learning Moving Objects in a Virtual Environment (Navy AI
Study).185 However, the Chinese research is not only far more advanced,
but also open-sourced.186 Indeed, China’s system is adaptable to any
environment or target across the globe.187 And, the code for China’s deep
reinforcement learning missile control systems is available on GitHub.188

177. Id. at 60.
178. Baker, supra note 12, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, Executive Summary III (2009),
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/Th
e%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
181. Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447.
182. JOHN JORDAN, ROBOTS 133 (2016).
183. Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447.
184. Id. at 37434.
185. Richard Wu, et al., supra note 37.
186. Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37435.
187. Id. at 37441.
188. youshixun, vCEW New model of cognitive electronic warfare with
countermeasures, GitHub https://github.com/youshixun/vCEW (2019).
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Further, Google’s TensorFlow, is also available open-source and designed
specifically for manufacturing and scalability.189
AI missile technology is comparatively simple relative to AI
controlled vehicles or rocket boosters due to the general lack of obstacles in
a missile’s environment. Indeed, there are at most three elements needed to
control an AI missile. First, a means of perception, which is commonly
achieved with Light Detection and Ranging Device (LiDAR) sensors.190
LiDAR sensors simply work by sending light pulses from a transmitter and
measuring return times with a receiver.191 The time it takes for a pulse to
, where is travel time, is
return measures distance according to
the speed of light, and is the distance between the LIDAR sensor and the
object.192 The receiver then generates a point cloud map of the environment
for processing.193
Second, the processing typically occurs with convolutional neural
networks (CNNs), which show state-of-the-art performance in computer
vision tasks.194 CNNs utilize convolutional mathematics to perform
computer vision tasks like object detection and classification.195 Further,
CNNs are well suited for three-dimensional point cloud environments and
integration with reinforcement learning algorithms.196 One study,
conducted by research firm OpenAI, demonstrated the effectiveness of
CNNs in real-time obstacle detection when integrated with reinforcement
learning systems.197
The third element is a method of optimization for decision making,
commonly reinforcement learning.198 For example, the China AI Missile
Study explored the use of DQN, PPO, and DDPG for control in its

189. TensorFlow 2.0 Alpha is Available, TensorFlow, (2019), https://www.ten
sorflow.org/install.
190. Jeff Hecht, Lidar for Self-Driving Cars, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.osa-opn.org/home/articles/volume_29/january_2018/features/lidar_for_self-dri
ving_cars/.
191. Gaetan Pennecot et al., Devices and Methods for a Rotating LIDAR Platform with
Shared Transmit/Receive Path, GOOGLE, INC., No: 13/971,606, (Aug. 20, 2013), https://pate
nts.google.com/patent/US9285464B2/en.
192. Matthew J. McGill, LIDAR Remote Sensing, NASA Technical Reports Server
(NTRS) (2002).
193. Maturana, Scherer, supra note 58, at 2.
194. Id.
195. Legrand, supra note 55, at 23.
196. Mnih et al., supra note 73, at 530.
197. Gregory Kahn, Uncertainty-Aware Reinforcement Learning for Collision
Avoidance (2017).
198. Shixun You et al., Completing Explorer Games with a Deep Reinforcement
Learning Framework Based on Behavior Angle Navigation, 8 ELECTRONICS 1,17 (2019).
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simulated, real-time physics engine.199 Additionally, the Navy AI Missile
Study experimented with the DQN algorithm.200 In the context of missile
control, the reinforcement learning agent is able to visualize its
environment with LiDAR and a CNN and generalize to avoid obstacles,
including defense missiles.201 This framework maximizes the probability of
success in target searching, detection, and engagement regardless of motion
dynamics.202 As such, AI missile systems guided by LiDAR sensor data
and controlled with deep reinforcement learning algorithms have the
capability to attack any target on Earth, or in the atmosphere, with pixel
precision.203 Importantly, this information and the tools to build such a
system are widely available on the internet.204
In short, Professor Crootof and Judge Baker’s misunderstandings
about the nature of autonomous weapons derive from their grouping of all
autonomous weapons as having analogous abilities and posing analogous
levels of threat.205 Indeed, modern AI missile systems, specifically, deep
reinforcement learning systems do not act in the same predictable ways as
the autonomous missile systems of the 1970s.206 In fact, they are much
different than the autonomous weapons of the 1970s.207 Critically, deep
reinforcement learning missiles today are able to generalize about their
environment, adapting, and evolving with the battlefield.208 Specifically,
Chinese AI missile technology “is enhanced by the powerful generalization
ability of . . . deep convolutional neural network[s].”209
Indeed, according to the 2019 Department of Defense Missile
Review, China now has the ability to threaten the United States with about
125 nuclear missiles.210 The Review explains while the United States relies
199. Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438.
200. Richard Wu et al., supra note 37, at 233.
201. Gregory Kahn et al., Uncertainty-Aware Reinforcement Learning for Collision
Avoidance (2017).
202. Serena Yeung et al., Every Moment Counts: Dense Detailed Labeling of Actions in
Complex Videos, 126 INT’L J. OF COMPUTER VISION 375, 376-378 (2017).
203. Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438.
204. See Richard Wu et al., supra note 37; see also youshixun, New model of cognitive
electronic warfare with countermeasures, GITHUB (2019) https://github.com/youshixun/v
CEW; Install TensorFlow 2, TENSORFLOW (2019) https://www.tensorflow.org/install;
Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37434-37447.
205. Crootof, supra note 173 at 59.
206. Id. at 60.
207. Baker, supra note 12, at 3; see also Shixun You, Completing Explorer Games with
a Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework Based on Behavior Angle Navigation, 8
ELECTRONICS 1,17 (2019).
208. Richard Wu et al., supra note 37, at 231.
209. Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438.
210. Office of the Secretary of Defense, supra note 180, at III.
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on deterrence to protect against sophisticated actors like China, active U.S.
missile defense efforts must outpace rogue offensive missile strikes.211 But,
despite massive over-spending, the United States Military is falling
behind.212 Further, due to the availability of AI missile system construction
and control information across the internet, AI missile attacks are an
immediate national security threat.213 This is especially true considering
hostile relationships with Iran, North Korea, and Middle Eastern militant
organizations.214 Intimately related to the applications of AI missiles in
national security, the role of AI in cybersecurity attacks is also a cause for
immediate concern.
B. Cybersecurity

Top U.S. national security officials believe that AI and machine
learning will have transformative implications for cybersecurity and cyber
war.215 For example, according to National Security Agency (NSA)
Director Paul M. Naksone, “As we look at near-peer competitors, China
and Russia clearly are at the top of the list because they have the capacity
to operate across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations.”216 However,
Naksone seems to be behind the times in terms of AI military applications
in cyberspace. Indeed, in a 2019 interview with National Defense
University, Naksone stated, “I think that the early instantiation of AI will
be on the defensive side.”217 Further, recent cybersecurity data and research
provide strong evidence AI is already fueling offensive state sponsored
cyber-attacks.
The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), a policy
research organization, records reported significant cyber-attacks on
governments, defense and high technology companies, or economic crimes

211. Id.
212. Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon buries evidence of $125 billion in
bureaucratic waste, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e
0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html; see also NATO, Defence Expenditure
of NATO Countries (2012-2019), NATO (June 25, 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf.
213. See youshixun, New model of cognitive electronic warfare with countermeasures,
GITHUB (2019), https://github.com/youshixun/vCEW; see also Install TensorFlow 2,
TENSORFLOW (2019), https://www.tensorflow.org/install.
214. Office of the Secretary of Defense, supra note 180, at III-IV.
215. Greg Allen &Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, HARV.
KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFF. 1, 18 (2017).
216. An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, National Defense University Press, JFQ 92,
1st Quarter, at 5 (2019).
217. Id. at 8.
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in excess of a million dollars.218 The table below illustrates the number of
Chinese and Russian cyber-attacks per year.219

While the accelerating trend in cyber-attacks could be due to a number of
factors, AI is unquestionably playing a contributing rule. Indeed, AI
provides more powerful attack mechanisms which are widely available,
making this trend likely to continue.220
Military defense and political hacking are now commonplace.221
Some of the most significant defense and political related attacks reported
by the CSIS include:222
1. May 2019. Hackers affiliated with the Chinese intelligence service
reportedly had been using NSA hacking tools since 2016, more
than a year before those tools were publicly leaked.
2. March 2019. U.S. officials reported that at least 27 universities in
the U.S. had been targeted by Chinese hackers as part of a
campaign to steal research on naval technologies.

218. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Cyber Incidents (August
2019), https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents.
219. See Appendix B. Significant Cyber Incidents for chart data (Chart prepared by
author with information from, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant
Cyber Incidents (August 2019), https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-progra
m/significant-cyber-incidents.
220. See Hyrum S. Anderson et al., Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning
Malware Models via Reinforcement Learning, Cornell University Library (2018),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.08917; see also endgameinc, Malware Env for OpenAI Gym
(2018), https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware.
221. Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (Aug. 2019),
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents.
222. Id.
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3. October 2018. Media reports state than U.S. agencies warned
President Trump that that China and Russia eavesdropped on call
made from an unsecured phone.
4. August 2018. Microsoft announces that Russian hackers had
targeted U.S. Senators and Center conservative think tanks critical
of Russia.
5. February 2016. Hackers breached the U.S. Department of Justice’s
database, stealing and releasing the names, phone numbers, and
email addresses or 30,000 DHS and FBI employees.
6. October 2016. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence and
Department of Homeland Security jointly identified Russia as
responsible for hacking the Democratic National Committee and
using WikiLeaks to dump emails obtained in the hack.
7. April 2015. U.S. officials report that hackers gained access to
White House networks and sensitive information, such as “realtime non-public details of the president’s schedule,” through the
State Department’s network, which has had continued trouble in
ousting attackers.
8. February 2012. Media reports say that Chinese hackers stole
classified information about the technologies onboard F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters.223
The pervasive use of cyberspace for a variety of covert international
operations provides support for the argument that an AI arms race is in full
swing.224 Indeed, AI provides a decisive advantage in the penetration and
security of networks.225 While it is difficult to know the specific
architectures used, the wide-spread availability of AI cyber-attack research
and code strongly suggests malicious AI software is already commonplace.226
As the data reflects, cyber-dependent nations are vulnerable to
political manipulation.227 Indeed, politically motivated cyber-attacks are far

223. Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (Aug. 2019),
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents. (List
derived from preceding source).
224. Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on
Non-Intervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146, 150
(2018).
225. Alberto Perez Veiga, Applications of Artificial Intelligence to Network Security, 14
(2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09992.
226. Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting,
Prevention, and Mitigation, 34 (Cornell University Library 2018) https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1802.07228.pdf; see also Anderson et al., supra note 220.
227. Kilovaty, supra note 224, at 150.
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from a new phenomenon.228 And, Russia has significantly expanded its
budget in these areas over the last few years to sway public opinion around
the world.229 One direct example, includes the Internet Research Agency
(IRA), a Russian intelligence company, and The Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Russian Army’s (GRU) hacking operations during the
2016 Presidential Election.230 According to the Mueller Report, the IRA
and GRU both engaged in hacking Democratic National Committee
networks for the purpose of influencing the election’s outcome.231 Further,
the Mueller Report details the IRA’s social media tactics with the intent of
swaying voters.232 Another example refers to the Cambridge Analytica
Scandal, where 87 million Facebook users had their personal data exposed
without their consent and used by Cambridge Analytica to support political
campaigns.233 As a result, data driven AI cyber-tools for manipulating
voters via social media are critical to the integrity of United States elections
and thus, National Security.234
Unsurprisingly, AI research in cybersecurity is rapidly expanding.
For example, one piece of scholarship specifically details guidelines for the
development of malicious AI software.235 The scholarship demonstrates the
practical possibilities of developing malicious machine learning algorithms
capable of harming humans.236 Another paper, Adversarial Reinforcement
Learning in a Cyber Security Simulation, introduces a game played
between adversarial reinforcement learning systems: an attacker and a
defender.237 The paper illustrates a cyber security simulation with two
Markov agents playing against each other as attacker and defender of a
cyber network.238 Drawing on this work, a third paper was introduced in
2019, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cyber Security, which developed a
similar simulation exploring the effectiveness of action-value, policy, and
228. WERBOS, supra note 63, at 184.
229. Kilovaty, supra note 224, at 158.
230. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 172, at 4.
231. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 172, at 4.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Felipe González et al., Global Reactions to the Cambridge Analytica Scandal: An
Inter-Language Social Media Study (2019), https://faculty.washington.edu/aragon/pubs/
LA_WEB_Paper.pdf.
234. Jon M. Garon, Cyber-World War III: Origins, 7 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 9
(2018).
235. Federico Pistono & Roman Yampolskiy, Unethical Research: How to Create
Malevolent Artificial Intelligence (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.02817.pdf.
236. Id.
237. Richard Elderman et al., Adversarial Reinforcement Learning in a Cyber Security
Simulation, SCITEPRESS (2017), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b495/7266c43f1c76ed
8dbb275b8510f6fb1e063c.pdf.
238. Id. at 566.
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actor-critic deep reinforcement learning models for network attack and
defense.239
Interestingly, one paper, Learning to Evade Static PE Machine
Learning Malware Models via Reinforcement Learning, gives specific
details regarding reinforcement learning malware models and provided an
open-source code on GitHub.240 The reinforcement learning model in the
paper is an evasive malware variant, which can be effective on samples not
used during training.241 Samples are prime examples of malware detection
software for processing and classifying data.242 The purpose of training is
to allow the reinforcement learning agent to generalize new experiences; in
other words, bypass new malware detection software.243 The algorithm uses
Q-learning and an MDP framework to train a reinforcement learning agent,
where the reward function is associated with an anti-malware detection
system (or an anti-malware engine).244 If the anti-malware system detects
the agent, its reward is zero, otherwise its reward is ten.245 The researchers
used OpenAI Gym, a software tool for building reinforcement learning
environments, to conduct their experiments.246 Consequently, the key
takeaway of the paper is that the attacker requires no prior knowledge
about the target to successfully penetrate a system under attack.247
Cyberspace allows humanity to communicate, trade, research, and
share information on a global scale.248 Yet, cyber-attacks are surging and
increasing in volume each year.249 As a result, data breaches have
escalated increasing criticisms from regulators, private plaintiffs, and
public opinion.250 On the global scale, data and information are only as
secure as the algorithms and network structures by which they are
protected. Arguably, nothing that happens on a computer is secure, let
239. Thanh Thi Nguyen & Vijay Janapa Reddi, Deep Reinforcement Learning for
Cyber Security (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05799.pdf.
240. Anderson et al., supra note 220; see also endgameinc, Malware Env for OpenAI
Gym (2018), https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware.
241. Anderson et al., supra note 220.
242. Anderson et al., supra note 220.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Greg Brockman et al., OpenAI Gym (2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01540.
247. Anderson et al., supra note 220.
248. Kilovaty, supra note 224, at 179.
249. Loren F. Selznick, Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity Liability: How Technically
Savvy Can We Expect Small Business Owners to Be?, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 219
(2018).
250. Thad A. Davis et al., The Data Security Governance Conundrum: Practical
Solutions and Best Practices for The Boardroom and The C-Suite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 613, 615 (2015).
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alone private.251 Thus, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
security at all levels.252 Indeed, the weaponization of cyberspace and
resulting cyberwarfare, are creating a world in which traditional security
defense models are futile.253 And, the capability of hacking an enemy car,
plane, nuclear reactor, communication system, or financial system has the
potential to cripple an opposition’s economy and defense capability.254
From a national security perspective, the United States is no longer
the world leader in cybersecurity.255 Indeed, The United States is under
constant attack online.256 Adversaries have caught up and arguably
surpassed domestic cyber capabilities.257 Many nations continue investing
heavily in AI research and its commercial capabilities, exploiting new
advances.258 At the same time, the United States has been ignoring AI over
the last decade.259 As a result, the United States is consistently attacked on
its vulnerable cyber-front and is subject to imminent national security
threats.260 While the United States faces imminent cybersecurity threats
stemming from AI, the development of Artificial General Intelligence
poses threats to both national and global security.
C. Artificial General Intelligence

AI’s holy grail, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), is a system capable
of achieving any goal.261 Current methods of AGI development are
commonly referred to as whole-brain emulation, where the idea is to
reverse engineer the human brain with computation.262 Yet, the Wright
brothers’ first flight was not aboard a mechanical bird with flapping
wings.263 In fact, prominent physicist Michio Kaku argues computers

251. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in The National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 14 (2008).
252. TIM MATHER ET AL., CLOUD SECURITY AND PRIVACY, Scitech Book News, Dec.
2009.
253. NAYAN B. RUPARELIA, CLOUD COMPUTING 108 (2016).
254. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 118.
255. Kadtke, Wharton, supra note 2, at 1.
256. John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to
National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 398 (2016).
257. An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, National Defense University Press, JFQ 92,
1st Quarter, at 5 (2019).
258. Kadtke, Wharton, supra note 2, at 2.
259. Id.
260. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Cyber Incidents (August
2019), https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents.
261. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 68.
262. KURZWEIL, supra note 9, at 124.
263. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 156.
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cannot truly replicate the behavior of human brains.264 Kaku argues the
shortcomings of modern neural networks persuasively, focusing on their
inability to account from neurochemical fluctuations in information
transfer.265
However, the legendary machine learning developer Paul John
Werbos argued, from an engineering point of view, the human brain is an
information processing system.266 Therefore, it may be more likely AGI
will result from a more simplified neural processing model capable of
recursive self-improvement.267 For example, famed philosopher of mind,
Zoltan Torey approaches the mind from a linguistic perspective.268 Indeed,
according to Torey, the mind is made up of perceptions and words
corresponding to those perceptions.269
Yet, some argue that AGI may never happen.270 For example, the
late Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen argues that scientific progress is
irregular and hypothesizes that at the end the twenty-first century humans
will have yet to achieve AGI.271 Indeed, current systems are far from
achieving many goals, particularly time-consuming tasks.272 One example
of such a task would be for a system to litigate a complex case in court
from the filing of the complaint, through discovery, all the way to trial and
verdict.273
To date, the closest mankind has come toward developing an AGI
was Volodymyr Mnih’s seminal paper, Human-Level Control Through
Deep Reinforcement Learning, where Mnih introduces the DQN algorithm
and associated software code for playing Atari Games.274 Max Tegmark
remarked of Minh’s paper, “deep reinforcement learning is a completely
general technique.”275 In this sense, Mnih’s algorithm, the DQN,

264.
265.
266.
267.

MICHIO KAKU, THE FUTURE OF THE MIND 342 (2014).
Id.
WERBOS, supra note 63, at 305.
MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 151 (2015). See also
TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 156.
268. ZOLTAN TOREY, THE CONSCIOUS MIND 61 (2014).
269. Id.
270. Paul G. Allen, The Singularity Isn’t Near, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2011)
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425733/paul-allen-the-singularity-isnt-near/.
271. Paul G. Allen, The Singularity Isn’t Near, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2011)
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425733/paul-allen-the-singularity-isnt-near/. [Id. ?]
272. MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 5 (2015).
273. This example ignores any legal ethics issues and is simply meant to be illustrative
of a complicated task.
274. Mnih et al., supra note 73, at 529. See also Code for Human-Level Control through
Deep Reinforcement Learning (2015), https://sites.google.com/a/deepmind.com/dqn/.
275. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 85.
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generalizes about its environment to achieve its goal.276 But the DQN is
limited by its environment, static reward structure, and training. Thus, a
challenge exists to improve the generalizable qualities of current state-ofthe-art AI systems.
From a national security perspective AGI is the end-all-be-all in
advanced weaponry.277 Any state or corporation capable of controlling AGI
would surely be capable of conquering the world.278 Indeed, with control of
a system capable of achieving any goal controlling enemy defense systems,
manipulating public opinion, and controlling information networks would
be relatively simple.279 However, there exists a question as to whether a
human creator could control an AGI.280 According to Max Tegmark, “we
have no idea what will happen if humanity succeeds in building humanlevel AGI.”281 Thus, we cannot take for granted that the outcome will be
positive if AGI is created.282

III. Policy
New generations of advanced technologies are changing the power
dynamics of our global society.283 Yet, legal scholarship on the topic of AI
policy has denied and relatively ignored the national security threats
associated with AI’s weaponization.284 For example, University of
Washington Law Professor, Ryan Calo encourages regulators not to be
distracted by claims of an “AI Apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on
“more immediate harms.”285 However, it is important to realize, AI’s most
immediate applications will be in warfare.
Generally, it is accepted that law never keeps up with
technology.286 However, the kinetics of the two systems are relative, and it
is more of an apples to oranges comparison. What is more likely to be true
is that United States policy makers and military leaders are ill-equipped to
put policies in place to maintain military superiority. For example, Judge
Baker explains, “I do not feel a sense of urgency to address the legal,

276. Mnih et al., supra note 73, at 531. See also Code for Human-Level Control through
Deep Reinforcement Learning (2015), https://sites.google.com/a/deepmind.com/dqn/.
277. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 106-107.
278. Id. at 96-97.
279. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 118.
280. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 155.
281. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 156.
282. PETER THEIL, ZERO TO ONE 195 (2014).
283. Kadtke, Wharton, supra note 2, at 2.
284. Calo, supra note 14, at 432.
285. Id. at 431.
286. Baker, supra note 12, at 7.
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ethical, and policy challenges ahead.”287 Another example includes South
Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham’s infamous question to Mark
Zuckerberg, “Is Twitter the same as what you do?” during the Senate
Judiciary & Commerce Committees Joint Hearing on Facebook Data
Use.288 As Elon Musk persuasively argues, what governments need right
now is not oversight, but rather insight, because right now the Government
does not even have insight into AI issues.289 Specifically, Musk contends
we need technically capable people in government positions who can
monitor AI’s progress and steer it if warranted.290 This Part explores the
policies and developments from the three countries leading the way in AI
militarization: Russia, China, and the United States. In analyzing the
United States, this Part makes specific recommendations to improve
current national security efforts.
Professor Crootof argues in any armed conflict, the right of the
parties in the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited.291 Furthermore, both customary international law and various
treaties circumscribe which weapons may be lawfully fielded.292 However,
this line of argument does not apply in the context of AI. In fact,
international laws and treaties are not laws in the sense that they are not
enforceable because the nature of law rests on the assumption certain
conduct be binding.293 As Hart argued, “If the rules of international law are
not binding it is surely indefensible to take seriously their classification as
law.”294 The Latin maxim Auctoritas non veritas facit legem; which stands
for the principle, authority, not truth, makes law, provides insight into the
fickle nature of international law.295 Or, in the words the English poet John
287. Id.
288. Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Facebook, Social Media Privacy,
and the Use and Abuse of Data (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/facebook-social-media-privacy-and-the-use-and-abuse-of-data. (Senator Graham
Questioning Zuckerberg at 1:53:40-1:53:51).
289. Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN
(July 15, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?431119-6/elon-musk-addresses-nga. (Musk
responding to Arizona Governor Doug Ducey at 57:00-60:00).
290. Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN
(July 15, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?431119-6/elon-musk-addresses-nga. See
also TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 108.
291. Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Limits of Analogy, 9
Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 51, 59 (2018).
292. Id.
293. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (3d. 2012).
294. Id.
295. THOMAS HOBBES: A PIONEER OF MODERNITY, 9 (2015) https://www.sunypress.edu/
pdf/63242.pdf.
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Lyly, “All is fair in love and war.”296 Therefore, any notion of an
international AI treaty would be moot. In addition to the United States,
China and Russia are making significant investments in AI for military
purposes.297
A. China

In July 2017 China’s State Council released an AI plan and
strategy calling for China to pass the United States by 2020 and become the
world’s leader in AI by 2030, committing $150 billion to the goal.298 By
the end of 2018, Chinese leadership assessed the program’s development as
surpassing the United States, achieving its objective earlier than
expected.299 A key advantage of China’s recent strategy has been in the
development of innovative new systems, in direct contrast to the United
States, whose commitments remain to updating outdated technologies and
political favors toward the military industrial complex.300
Indeed, as a direct result of China’s recent investments, China’s
military and intelligence services possess the sophistication and resources
to hack network systems, establish footholds behind perimeter defenses,
exfiltrate valuable information, and sabotage critical network functions.301
In fact, Chinese government organizations routinely translate, disseminate,
and analyze U.S. government and think tank reports about AI.302 Further, in
2017, China expressed a desire to utilize AI for flight guidance and target
recognition systems in its new generations of cruise missiles.303 Just two
years later, that desire was realized, and China is the world’s leader in
missile technology with its development of deep reinforcement learning
control systems for targeting and guidance.304 Further, Chinese
296. John Lyly Quotes, Goodreads, (2019) https://www.goodreads.com/author/
quotes/139084.John_Lyly.
297. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial
Intelligence Strategy 5 (2018), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/
1755942/dod-unveils-its-artificial-intelligence-strategy/.
298. Baker, supra note 12, at 1.
299. Allen, supra note 6, at 9.
300. Alexander Rogosa, Shifting Spaces: The Success of The SpaceX Lawsuit and The
Danger of Single-Source Contracts in America’s Space Program, 25 Fed. Circuit B.J. 101,
104 (2015). See also Chris Anderson, Elon Musk’s Mission to Mars, WIRED MAGAZINE
(Oct. 21, 2012) https://www.wired.com/2012/10/ff-elon-musk-qa/.
301. John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to
National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 402-403 (2016).
302. Allen, supra note 6, at 3.
303. STEPHAN DE SPIEGELEIRE, ET AL., THE HAGUE CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF DEFENSE: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR
SMALL – AND MEDIUM-SIZED FORCE PROVIDERS 79 (2017).
304. YOU, ET AL., supra note 102, at 37447.
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intercontinental ballistic missile and cruise missile systems reflect the stateof-the-art.305
Chinese commercial markets for autonomous drones and AI
surveillance technologies have seen significant growth and success.306
Additionally, Chinese weapons manufacturers are already selling armed AI
controlled drones.307 Chinese AI market success directly increases its
military and intelligence abilities because Chinese companies developing
AI work in close cooperation with the Chinese Military.308 Some argue that
many Chinese AI achievements are actually achievements of multinational
research teams and companies.309 For example, regarding SpaceX’s
decision not to patent its rocket technologies, Founder & CEO Elon Musk
stated, “our primary long-term competition is in China—if we published
patents, it would be farcical, because the Chinese would just use them as a
recipe book.”310 Notably, none of the most popular machine learning
software frameworks have been developed in China.311 However, China’s
behavior of aggressively developing, utilizing, and exporting increasingly
autonomous robotic weapons and surveillance AI technology runs counter
to China’s stated goals of avoiding an AI arms race.312
B. Russia

Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s commitment to AI
technologies stating, “[W]hoever becomes the leader in this field will rule
the world.”313 Further, Russia continues to display a steady commitment to
developing and deploying a wide range of AI military weapons.314 In fact,
Russia is significantly expanding its budget in AI cybersecurity to sway
public and political opinion around the world.315 For example, the IRA and
GRU continue their hacking operations relating to United States

305. Michael S. Chase, PLA Rocket Force Modernization and China’s Military
Reforms, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
RAND Corporation (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT489.html.
306. Allen, supra note 6, at 6.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 21.
309. Id. at 10.
310. Anderson, supra note 300.
311. Allen, supra note 6, at 12.
312. Allen, supra note 6, at 7.
313. SAYLER, supra note 7, at 1.
314. DE SPIEGELEIRE, ET AL., supra note 303, at 81.
315. Kilovaty, supra note 224, at 158.
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elections.316 These efforts largely reflect effective and extensive use of AI
driven cybersecurity technologies.317
Indeed, Russia stands out as a renewed threat in cyberspace.318
Russia has demonstrated consistent and effective capabilities in
implementing AI for behavior influencing.319 Prior to the 2016 presidential
election, the IRA utilized Facebook and YouTube, targeting millions of
users with advertisements aimed at influencing the election’s outcome.320
Further, in October 2017, news broke of a Russian spy campaign targeted
at key United States officials beginning in 2015 and lasting until the
intrusion was discovered by the United States in September 2017.321
In addition, Russia is establishing a number of organizations
devoted to the development of military AI applications.322 Indeed, the
Russian military has been researching and developing AI robotics control
systems, with an emphasis on autonomous vehicles and planes with
autonomous target identification and engagement capabilities.323And, in
March 2018, Russia released plans for a National Center for Artificial
Intelligence, among other defense related initiatives.324 Despite Russia’s
aspirations, some analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make
significant progress in AI development due to lack of funding.325 However,
others argue despite trailing behind the United States and China in military
funding, Russia has still managed to become a powerful force in
cyberspace.326 For example, in 2013 Russia was confident enough to grant
the infamous Edward Snowden political asylum against pressure from the
United States.327
C. United States

On February 11, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order
aimed at establishing America’s place as the global leader in artificial

316. ROBERT S. MUELLER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 4.
317. SAYLER, supra note 7, at 24.
318. Garon, supra note 234, at 4.
319. DE SPIEGELEIRE, ET AL., supra note 303, at 67.
320. Garon, supra note 234, at 8-9.
321. Id. at 6-7.
322. DE SPIEGELEIRE, ET AL., supra note 303, at 81-82.
323. Congressional Research Service, supra note 7, at 23.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 24.
326. Id.
327. David D. Cole, Assessing the Leakers: Criminals or Heroes?, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 107, 107 (2015). See also Jacob Stafford, Gimme Shelter: International Political
Asylum in The Information Age, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1167, 1170 (2014).
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intelligence technology.328 The Executive Order on Maintaining American
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (Executive Order), explains the United
States’ policy to enhance scientific, technological, and economic leadership
in AI research and development guided by five principles:329
1. The United States must drive technological breakthroughs in AI
across the Federal Government, industry, and academia in order to
promote scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and
national security.
2. The United States must drive development of appropriate technical
standards and reduce barriers to the safe testing and deployment of
AI technologies in order to enable the creation of new AI-related
industries and the adoption of AI by today’s industries.
3. The United States must train current and future generations of
American workers with the skills to develop and apply AI
technologies to prepare them for today’s economy and jobs of the
future.
4. The United States must foster public trust and confidence in AI
technologies and protect civil liberties, privacy, and American
values in their application in order to fully realize the potential of
AI technologies for the American people.
5. The United States must promote an international environment that
supports American AI research and innovation and opens markets
for American AI industries, while protecting our technological
advantage in AI and protecting our critical AI technologies from
acquisition by strategic competitors and adversarial nations.330
While, the Executive Order is a nice gesture in supporting development in
the right direction, a clear course of action is lacking.331 The United States
Government has a limited rule in scientific progress and development.
Specifically, the only real role played in the development of technology
comes from the power of the purse.332 And, the Executive Order does not
provide for new research funds.333

328. Donald J. Trump, Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in
Artificial Intelligence, Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 14, 2019).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Winston Luo, President Trump Issues Executive Order to Maintain American
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, HARV. J. J.L. & TECH. REPORTS, (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/president-trump-issues-executive-order-to-maintain-ameri
can-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence.
332. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of The Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988).
333. Luo, supra note 331.
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Some AI & Law scholars argue AI should be regulated by a
Government agency.334 For example, Matthew Scherer argues that the
starting point for regulating AI should be a statute that establishes the
general principles of AI regulation.335 Scherer proposes the Artificial
Intelligence Development Act (“AIDA”), which would create an agency
tasked with certifying the safety of AI systems.336 The main idea is that
AIDA would delegate the substantive task of assessing the safety of AI
systems to an independent agency staffed by specialists, thus insulating
decisions about the safety of specific AI systems from the pressures exerted
by electoral politics.337 But, it is unlikely that standard command and
control models of regulation would be effective to regulate AI.338
Further, Government agencies are notorious for over-spending and
political corruption, specifically in defense procurement and regulation.339
Indeed, in the words of the late John McCain, “Our broken defense
acquisition system is a clear and present danger to the national security of
the United States.”340 Despite calls for change, the military industrial
complex is far too politically powerful to allow the system to improve.341
Indeed, despite outspending Russia and China combined on defense, the
United States is still falling behind.342 The reason is largely attributable to
billions in administrative waste and a lack of agency accountability.343 In
fact, one report suggests the Chinese are confident the United States will
fail to innovate, continuing to overspend maintaining and upgrading
outdated systems.344 Others argue, no matter the potential for AI, the

334. Scherer, supra note 8, at 394.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 393.
337. Id.
338. Michael Guihot, et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial
Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 415 (2017).
339. Whitlock, Woodward, supra note 212. See also University Research Company,
LLC, 2004 WL 2496439, at 10 (2004). See also Femme Comp Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed.
Cl. 704, 767 (2008).
340. United States Committee on Armed Services, Press Release: Senate Armed
Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-armed-servicescommittee-completes-markup-of-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year- 2016.
341. See generally Brian S. Haney, Automated Source Selection & FAR Compliance, 48
PUB. CONT. L.J. (2019) (Forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=3261360
342. Niall McCarthy, The Top 15 Countries for Military Expenditure in 2016, FORBES
(Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countri
es-for-military-expenditure-in-2016-infographic/#6ef65a0b43f3.
343. Whitlock & Woodward, supra note 212.
344. Allen, supra note 6, at 8.
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Government should handle development carefully.345 But the United States
Government may have a more limited role in AI development than many
suspect.
Private companies are driving progress in AI. For example, Google
has a massive intelligence portfolio.346 Some argue, Google’s AI
technologies are scalable to an AGI model.347 Commercial AI products are
already heavily deployed in marketing. Indeed, to take advantage of the
services offered by today’s major online corporation such as Google,
Facebook, and Twitter, consumers are forced to give away a great deal of
personal information.348 A person’s browser history and buying habits,
together with their personal information, are enough for machine learning
algorithms to predict what they’ll buy and how much they’ll pay for it.349
Interestingly, Judge Baker argues, national security law serves
three purposes, providing essential values, process, and the substantive
authority to act, as well as the left and right boundaries of action.350
However, law is characterized by the relationship between a sovereign and
subject acting in a habit of obedience.351 Whether, technology companies
like Facebook, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple have more
sovereignty than the United States an interesting debate. Further, most AI
research advances are occurring in the private sector, where talent and
funding exceeds the United States Government.352 As a result, militaries
and intelligence agencies depend on the private sector for essential goods
and services.353 Thus, some suggest the challenges of regulating fast-

345. Michael Guihot et al., supra note 338, at 454.
346. US 2015/0100530, Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement Learning, to Mnih,
et al., Google (2015). WO 2018/083532, World Intellectual Property Organization, Training
action selection using neural networks, to Wang Ziyu, et al., DeepMind (2016). WO
2018/083667 World Intellectual Property Organization Reinforcement Learning systems, to
Silver, et al. DeepMind (2016). WO 2018071392, World Intellectual Property Organization,
Neural networks for selecting actions to be performed by a robotic agent, to Pascanu,
Razvan, et al., DeepMind (2016). WO 2018/081089, World Intellectual Property
Organization, Processing sequences using neural networks, to Van Den Oord, et al.,
DeepMind (2016).
347. Iuliia Kotseruba, John K. Tsotsos, A Review of 40 Years in Cognitive Architectures
Research Core Cognitive Abilities and Practical Application, 7 (2018), https://arxiv.org/
abs/1610.08602v3.
348. MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 170 (2015).
349. Id.
350. Baker, supra note 13, at 6.
351. Hart, supra note 293, at 50.
352. Allen, Chan, supra note 215, at 1.
353. Johnathan Wakely, Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk is an Open
Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 9 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 4 (2018).
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moving technology are so great that industry self-regulatory approaches are
often presented as the most effective mechanism to manage risk.354
Therefore, one argument is the United States’ national security law is in the
hands of private companies, rather than the Government.
Some argue the United States’ technological superiority is
increasingly being challenged by competitors.355 In truth, the United States
government’s technological superiority has already been surpassed, if not
by China, certainly by the private sector.356 Indeed, a serious question
exists as to whether the AI arms race is between governments or private
firms. Matthew Scherer argues Microsoft Google, Facebook, Amazon, and
Baidu are in a private AI arms race.357 An indication of this arms race is
Microsoft’s investment, OpenAI, whose stated mission is “to ensure that
artificial general intelligence (AGI)—by which we mean highly
autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically
valuable work—benefits all of humanity.”358 This mission was only slightly
believable until the company received $1 billion in funding from
Microsoft.359 Google’s AI principles include a mission to create an AI that
is socially beneficial.360 Yet, despite being a world leader in AI, Google’s
AI is used mainly for advertising, where Google derives ninety-five percent
of its revenue.361
There is little social benefit or societal good to come from AI.
There are some benefits in fields like law and medicine, but AI innovation
fails to solve the access problems foundational to these industries.362 At a
354. Michael Guihot, et al., supra note 338, at 431.
355. Kadtke & Wharton, supra note 2, at 1.
356. US 2015/0100530, Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement Learning, to Mnih,
et al., Google (2015). WO 2018/083532, World Intellectual Property Organization, Training
action selection using neural networks, to Wang Ziyu, et al., DeepMind (2016). WO
2018/083667 World Intellectual Property Organization Reinforcement Learning systems, to
Silver, et al. DeepMind (2016). WO 2018071392, World Intellectual Property Organization,
Neural networks for selecting actions to be performed by a robotic agent, to Pascanu,
Razvan, et al., DeepMind (2016). WO 2018/081089, World Intellectual Property
Organization, Processing sequences using neural networks, to Van Den Oord, et al.,
DeepMind (2016).
357. Scherer, supra note 8, at 354.
358. OpenAI Charter, OpenAI (April 9, 2018), https://openai.com/charter/.
359. Stephen Nellis, Microsoft to Invest $1 Billion in OpenAI, Reuters (July 22, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-openai/microsoft-to-invest-1-billion-in-opena
i-idUSKCN1UH1H9.
360. Sundar Pichai, AI at Google: Our Principles, (June 7, 2018), https://ai.go
ogle/principles/.
361. GILDER, supra note 79, at 37.
362. HEMANT TANEJA, UNSCALED: HOW AI AND NEW GENERATION OF UPSTARTS ARE
CREATING THE ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE, 73 (2018). See also KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS 3 (2018).

4 - HANEY_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

96

12/4/2019 10:01 AM

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

deeper level, inequality and injustice are largely supported by societal
structures, staying blind to technological developments and AI will only
exacerbate these problems. Indeed, AI is developing in corporations whose
principle purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.363 Further, the AI &
Ethics school of thought is largely idealistic and academic.364 In a perfect
world, corporate ethics would support AI development in compliance with
certain principles.365 In reality, the United States Government has little
control over profit driven big technology corporations and lacks
meaningful insight into AI research.366 The Russian and Chinese
Government also lack control over big technology corporations, relying on
their research to develop their own AI systems. 367 In sum, the dynamics of
United States AI national security policy largely revolve around decisions
made by corporate actors, specifically: Amazon, Google, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Apple.368 There is an improbable exception that a
breakthrough in AI will occur by a smaller team or single person producing
AGI.369

Conclusion
Conventional wisdom teaches technological progress is driven by
the Law of Accelerating Returns (LOAR).370 The LOAR’s application to
information technology, Moore’s Law, projects exponential trends in
technological progress converging to an ultimate technological
singularity.371 This notion has developed into a school of thought called
Technological Utopianism.372 Technological Utopianism refers to the idea
that digital life is the natural and desirable next step in the cosmic evolution

363. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of The Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 407, 409 (2006).
364. Karl & Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 106, 160 (2019).
365. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003,
1051 (2017).
366. Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 231 (2019). See also
Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15,
2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?431119-6/elon-musk-addresses-nga. (Musk responding
to Arizona Governor Doug Ducey at 57:00-60:00).
367. Allen, supra note 6, at 12.
368. Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and The Digital Audience, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2019).
369. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 101.
370. Haney, supra note 22 at 155.
371. KURZWEIL, supra note 9, at 250.
372. TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 32.
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of humanity, which will be good.373 As a result of Technological
Utopianism, a majority of literature on the subject of technology is
inherently optimistic, both in terms of outcomes and rates of progress.374
Yet, it is critical to resist the temptation to accept the claims of this
literature.375 The future does not happen on its own and AI technologies
could certainly have terrible outcomes.376
One argument for the future of the United States Government in AI
development is to pursue an open government model. Open government is
a concept referring to the free flow of information between the Government
and the public.377 The goal of such a model would be to improve
transparency, education and access to critical AI information.378 As a result,
AI issues could be discussed, debated, and decided democratically.
However, in practice there is little hope such a model would be put into
practice. This is particularly true in the United States where agencies fight
tooth and nail to hide information to which the public has a right via FOIA
litigation.379
A second argument is that AI technology’s likely dissemination
into the wrong hands resolves the Fermi Paradox. A paradox is a set of
arguments with apparently true propositions, leading to a false
conclusion.380 Consider, the Milky Way is one of hundreds of billions of
galaxies in the Universe, each containing hundreds of billions of stars.381
Commonly, these stars contain Earth-like planets.382 As a result,
statistically it is almost certain life would have developed somewhere else
in the Universe before life on Earth.383 And yet, mankind finds itself bound
to a pale blue dot on the outskirts of the Milky Way, apparently alone in the
Universe. Fermi’s Paradox asks the question, “Where are they?”384

373. MARTINE ROTHBLATT, VIRTUALLY HUMAN 283 (2104).
374. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 34.
375. Peter Thiel, The Education of a Libertarian, CATO UNBOUND (May 1, 2009).
376. PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE 195 (2014).
377. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895 (2006).
378. Joshua Apfelroth, The Open Government Act: A Proposed Bill to Ensure the
Efficient Implementation of The Freedom of Information Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 219, 220
(2006).
379. John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., FOIA’s Common Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 576
(2019). (FOIA is an acronym for Freedom of Information Act).
380. MARGARET CUONZO, PARADOX 2 (2014).
381. CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE 21
(1994).
382. Nick Bostrom, In the Great Silence there is Great Hope 2 (2007) https://nick
bostrom.com/papers/fermi.pdf.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 5.
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The great British Mathematician Irving J. Good argued AGI would
be the “last invention that man need ever make.”385 And the late Stephen
Hawking observed, “The development of artificial intelligence could spell
the end of the human race.”386 Further, both Nick Bostrom and Max
Tegmark have argued persuasively, humans may not be able to control
AGI.387 These observations provide support that AI may lead to a
catastrophic event resolving the Fermi Paradox.
In sum, the United States’ national security is now dependent, not
on its Military or Defense Agencies, but on big technology companies. In
part because big technology companies have powerful influence over
political decision makers.388 Further, big technology companies have the
most talented people and own the rights to the most powerful weapons.
Yet, the answer is not to break up big technology companies, which
disadvantages the United States compared to our adversaries.389 Instead the
answer is to accept the changing power dynamics and do the best we can
with a broken political system. The only alternative would be revolution.390

385. Irvin J. Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6
ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 31 (1965).
386. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End
Mankind, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://christusliberat.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
Stephen-Hawking-warns-artificial-intelligence-could-end-mankind-BBC-News.pdf.
387. BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 155. See also TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 176.
388. Megan Henney, Big tech has spent $582M lobbying Congress. Here’s where that
money went, FOXBUSINESS (July 26, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/
amazon-apple-facebook-google-microsoft-lobbying-congress.
389. Sheelah Kolhatkar, How Elizabeth Warren Came Up with a Plan to Break Up Big
Tech, THE NEW YORKER (August 20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
how-elizabeth-warren-came-up-with-a-plan-to-break-up-big-tech.
390. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A TRANSCRIPTION
(July 4, 1776), https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.
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APPENDIX B. SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENTS DATA
Year

China

Russia

2009
(September 2008 - August 2009)

3

2

2010
(September 2009 - August 2010)

9

3

2011
(September 2010 - August 2011)

4

0

2012
(September 2011 - August 2012)

4

0

2013
(September 2012 - August 2013)

8

4

2014
(September 2013 - August 2014)

3

0

2015
(September 2014 - August 2015)

7

5

2016
(September 2015 - August 2016)

3

5

2017
(September 2016 - August 2017)

4

11

2018
(September 2017 - August 2018)

13

27

2019
(September 2018 - August 2019)

24

30
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